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SOME ASPECTS OF UNILATERAL MISTAKE
I

T

HE modern theory of contract, as expounded by Professor
Williston 1 and others, that an actual meeting of the
minds is not always necessary to a pact, but that expressed
intention is the determining factor, solves many a difficult
problem of mistake. The older theory, that true mental assent of both parties to all terms must accompany expressed
intention and apparent assent in order that a contract might
result, has caused considerable trouble. Among other things,
it has led to an idea quite prevalent that unilateral mistake
is ipso facto remediable by rescission (by act of the mistaken
party, or by decree of equity on his petition in a proper case),
and that only reformation requires a showing of mutual mistake.2 If this were true, great injustice would frequently be
done to persons with every right to insist on the continuance
of performance of contracts negotiated.3
Suppose, for example, that A owns two yachts, one of
which is a gasoline yacht worth $5,000 and the other a sail
boat worth $2,500. The former is named "Sally" and the latter "Nancy." A leaves the "Nancy" at the XYZ Club landing, the "Sally" being at a boatyard. During the day, unknown to A, his boatmen bring the "Sally" to the Club
landing from the yard and put the "Nancy" up at the
yard. That evening A meets B whom he knows to have been
at the club that afternoon, and asks B, "Will you buy my
boat at the Club for $2,500 ?" A means the sail-boat "Nancy."
B, thinking that A means the gasoline yacht "Sally," replies
"Yes." No one has been negligent, no one at fault, yet B is
clearly entitled to the benefit of the contract. The mistake
'Williston on Contracts (1924), Sec. 605.
2Moffet v. Rochester, 178 U. S. 373, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 957 (1900); Board
of School Commissioners, etc. v. Bender, 36 Ind. App. 164, 72 N. E. 154 (1904) ;
Harper, Inc. v. City of Newburgh, 159 App. Div. 695, 145 N. Y. Supp. 59
(2nd Dept. 1913) ; 23 R. C. L. 328, Sec. 20, last sentence.
' Tatum v. Coast Lumber Co., 16 Idaho 471, 101 Pac. 957 (1909) ; Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226 Il1. 9, 80 N. E. 564 (1907); Bibber v. Carville, 101
Me. 59, 63 Atl. 303 (1905) ; Brown v. Levy, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 389, 69 S. W.
255 (1902). In these cases are to be found statements in keeping with the
theory of the article.
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on A's part, though not due to his negligence or fault of any
kind originatedwith him through the expression he chose to
give his intention and he should be denied rescission. B is
justified in concluding that when A, the owner of the boat,
offers it to him with an identification of it by a statement of
its whereabouts, he knows which of the boats is there. Even
if B knew that A owned another boat, the result would be the
same, in the absence of proof that B, in accepting, knew of
A's mistake. This, of course, would change the aspect of the
situation, for if A could show that when B accepted he knew
that A'did not have in mind selling the "Sally," the equities
would all be in A's favor.
On the other hand, were B to seek out A and offer $5,000
"for your boat 'Nancy'" meaning the "Sally," and were A,
not knowing of B's mistake, to accept, B should be held to his
contract. A was justified in concluding that when B came to
him using in his offer the name of A's boat, he, B, knew what
boat he was offering to purchase. And so, in this instance,
even if B were not at fault, as, if he thought that A owned
a gasoline yacht only and knew that A owned a "Nancy," so
that B thereupon concluded that the "Nancy" was A's gasoline yacht, the result would be the same, for B's mistake
originatedwith himself.
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts prepared by
the American Law Institute sets forth its views in accord
with the newer doctrine.4 What governs is the intention or
idea expressed, and the ordinary intendment thereofY In the
"Comment" following the statement of the abstract rule that
expressed intention is the important thing, the Restatement
continues as follows:
"The mental assent of the parties is not requisite
for the formation of a contract. If the words or acts
of one of the parties have but one reasonable meaning,
his intention is material only in the exceptional case
* * * that an unreasonable meaning which he attaches

to his manifestations is known to the other party. If
the words or other acts of the parties have more than
'Sec. 71.
'Ibid. Subd. (a).
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one reasonable meaning, it must be determined which
of the possible meanings is to be taken. If either party
has reason to know that the other will give the words
or acts, only one of those meanings and, in fact, the
words or acts are so understood, the party conscious
of the ambiguity is bound in accordance with that understanding. On the other hand, if a party has no
reason to suppose that there is ambiguity, he may assert that his words or other acts bear the meaning that
he intended, that being one of their legitimate meanings, and he will not be bound by a different meaning
attached to them by the other party." 6
The cases offered as the New York annotations to Subdivision (a) of Section 71 of the Restatement do not shed
light on our present problem. 7 In two of them it was taken
for granted that the minds of the parties had not met and
the methods by which the misunderstandings occurred were
not stated sufficiently to aid us.8 In two there was not even
the appearance of agreement on the defendant's part as to
the thing for which plaintiff, the mistaken party, contended,
and so in each case the plaintiff failed to hold the defendant
to the former's gratuitous understanding of the agreement.
In the remaining case the defendant's mistake was induced
' This is supplemented in the Restatement with hypothetical cases to illustrate, one of which follows: "Illustrations: 1. A offers B to sell goods shipped
from Bombay ex-steamer 'Peerless.' B expresses assent to the proposition.
There are, however, two steamers of the name 'Peerless.' It may be supposed.
(1) that A knows, or has reason to know the fact, and that B neither knows
nor has reason to know it; (2) conversely, that B knows or has reason to know
it and that A does not; (3) that both know or have reason to know of the
ambiguity; or (4) that neither of them knows or has reason to know it at the
time when the communication between them took place. In the first case supposed there is a contract from the steamer which B has in mind. In the second
case there is a contract for the goods from the steamer which A has in mind.
In the third and fourth case there is no contract unless A and B in fact intend
the same steamer. In that event there is a contract for the goods from that

steamer."

(Italics ours.)

14 Corn. L. Q. (Supp.) 57 (1929).

'Scranton v. Booth, 29 Barb. 171 (N. Y. 1859); Fullerton v. Dalton, 58
Barb. 236 (N. Y. 1870).
'Booth v. Bierce et al., 38 N. Y. 463 (1868);

229 (1874).

Cutts v. Guild, 57 N. Y.
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by the fact that he had been misled by the representative of
the plaintiff, so that the right to rescind was clear. 10
The writer does not intend to express disagreement with
the cases which hold that gross inadequacy of consideration
coupled with mistake is sufficient ground for rescission.
Neither is it easy to quarrel with the view of Mr. Lawrence
that relief may be granted for unilateral mistake standing
alone or perhaps even coupled with negligence of the mistaken party, if the party not mistaken has not changed his
position, and that retaining the benefits of a mistake is not
to be permitted unless relief would be prejudicial to the one
unfairly benefited." Each case involving such considerations
must be dealt with as a separate problem. Instances where
there are questions of inadequacy of consideration may perhaps be disposed of by the test of whether the inadequacy is
so great as to amount to implied notice to the party who has
obtained the benefit of a mistake. Still others wherein the
question of whether relief can be given to a mistaken party
because the other has not changed his position necessitate a
determination of what is sufficient change of position to
justify a denial of rescission.
Furthermore, one must accord in principle with most of
the cases in which specific performance is denied to plaintiffs because of unilateral mistake of defendants, for the reason that it is within the equitable discretion of the court to
refuse to make an oppressive decree. Such cases, however,
are not authority for any claim that rescission would have
been permitted to such defendants to the denial of the possible legal remedies of the plaintiffs.' 2
An analysis of the subject would not be complete without a consideration of Harper v. City of Newburgh '3 and
Moffett v. City of Rochester. 14 In Harper v. City of New"Consumers

Ice Co. v. Webster, 32 App. Div. 592, 53 N. Y. Supp. 56

(4th Dept. 1898) and 79 App. Div. 350, 79 N. Y. Supp. 385 (4th Dept. 1903)
(reported twice).
" Lawrence, Equity Jurisprudence (1929), Sec. 1072.

"Mansfield v. Sherman, 81 Me. 365, 17 Atl. 300 (1889) ; Heneke v. Cooke.
135 Md. 417, 109 AtI. 113 (1919); Quincy v. Chute, 156 Mass. 189, 30 N. E.
550 (1892) ; Sullivan v. Jennings, 44 N. J. Eq. 11, 14 Atl. 104 (1888).
12
Supra Note 2.
Supra Note 2.
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burgh the plaintiff was granted rescission of a bid (and its
consequences, arising out of the acceptance of the bid and
the rights the City then had against the plaintiff on a certified check because of his refusal to perform) upon the ground
of unilateral mistake. The fact thereof was not apparent on
the face of the bid. 15 It can be said, therefore, that the expressed intention ought to have governed. The fact that the
result may have been partly justified on the ground that the
charter of the City required a written contract does not dispose of the fact that in justice the defendant ought at least to
have had recourse against the plaintiff's certified check to
cover the cost of advertising for new bids, nor does the charter provision justify the opinion, which, in its entirety, indicates and says that the ground for the award of relief was
the unilateral mistake. The defendant was not at fault; on
the contrary, it had every right to believe that the bid of the
plaintiff was in all respects a true and real bid. The mistake originated with the plaintiff in the expressibn of its
intention.
In the Moffett case, the facts were substantially the same
with two exceptions: The charter of the defendant made it
impossible to withdraw bids as and when the plaintiff attempted to do so, and it was shown in the facts and opinion that there was a considerable discrepancy between the
amount of the plaintiff's bid and that of the nearest bidder.
The result was the same, and the grounds stated to be the
same as in the Harper case. The charter provision was stated
to be effective, but was avoided as controlling upon the
ground that the bid was not a bid at all, but a mistake! The
discrepancy between the amounts bid by the plaintiff and his
nearest competitor was clearly not enough to put the City
upon notice that the plaintiff had made a mistake. At least
the City should have had the right of recourse against the
plaintiff for the cost of a new bidding.1 6 Equal (if not
City of New York v. Dowd Lumber Co., 140 App. Div. 358, 125 N. Y.
Supp. 394 (lst Dept. 1910). (A mistake was apparent on the face of a bid
submitted by defendant to the plaintiff; the Court therefore released the defendant from any obligation to the plaintiff.)
" 8John J. Bowes Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Milton, 255 Mass. 228, 151
N. E. 116 (1926).
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stronger) criticism can be made of this case as of the Harper
7
case.'
Included among the utterances of the courts on this topic
is the case of Salomon v. North British & Mercantile Co.,
etc.' s In it, for a purely unilateral mistake of the plaintiff
(through his agent), not only did the Court award relief but
designated as proper relief, reformation. Plaintiff was the
assignee of a mortgage upon real property and of the mortgagee's rights under a policy of fire insurance upon the improvements. He instructed his broker to have the defendant
insurance carrier endorse the policy to the effect that the loss
was payable to the plaintiff. The broker erroneously asked
an endorsement that the plaintiff was the owner, "loss payable as before" (i.e., to the assignor). The defendant complied with the broker's request. A fire caused a loss and,
upon the defendant's refusal to pay it, the plaintiff sought
reformation. The Court, mindful of the formula that reformation is to be had only for mutual mistake, professed to see
mutuality of mistake in that both parties were mistaken, the
plaintiff as to what his broker had requested, the defendant
as to what the plaintiff desired. "It is not essential, I think,
to the right to the reformation of an instrument," said Mr.
Justice Laughlin in the prevailing opinion concurred in by
Miller and Dowling, JJ., "that the mistake on the part of
each party shall be with respect to precisely the same fact."
Mr. Justice Laughlin overlooked not only the theory of reformation but the very essence of mutuality. There can be no
doubt that to be mutually mistaken, parties must be laboring
under the identical misapprehension.' 9 No question as to
which of the parties was the broker's principal was involved.
It was taken for granted that the broker was the agent of the
plaintiff. The mistake was clearly unilateral.
The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice McLaughlin, concurred in by the Presiding Justice, indicates an uneasy feel' Objectionable for like reasons is the case of Board of School Commis-

sioners, etc. v. Bender, supra Note 2.

150 App. Div. 728, 135 N. Y. Supp. 806 (1st Dept. 1912).
" Page v. Higgins, 150 Mass. 27, 22 N. E. 63 (1889) ; Botsford v. McLean,

45 Barb. 478 (N. Y. 1866).
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ing that the decision was violative of accepted principle, not
to say of justice. It was there said:
if the policy can be reformed under such
circumstances then I am unable to see why the court
cannot reform any contract if it does not express
what one of the parties intended, even though it does
express precisely what the other party intended it
should. Parties, not courts, make contracts. To reform the policy as asked by plaintiff is to have the
court make a contract for the parties which they did
not and never intended to make." 20
"**

*

Neither in justice nor upon the ground of expediency can
the decision be justified. That the minds of the parties had
never met, so that there was nothing to be reinstated by a
decree of reformation, should have been conclusive reason for
denying that relief. That the mistake was but unilateral on
the plaintiff's part with nothing by way of additional facts
to constitute superior equities in his favor, should have been
conclusive reason for denying any other relief.
The cases thus considered clearly illustrate the looseness
of utterance and incorrectness of adjudication which is consequent upon the judicial failure to grasp the inherent equity
of the newer theory and the potential injustice in the application of the older.
II
It may not be amiss to consider some of the many cases
of unilateral mistake remediable because of some peculiar
equity, or combination of circumstances, excluding cases involving unilateral mistake induced by fraud or inequitable
conduct.
The City of New York v. Dowd Lumber Co.21 presents
an illustration of the proper application of the newer theory.
There the mistake was apparent on the face of the offer accepted by the plaintiff, consisting as it did of visible error
" Supra Note 18 at 733, 135 N. Y. Supp. at 809.
" Supra Note 15.
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in computation. If the plaintiff did not know of the mistake,
it ought to have known of it. Rescission was inevitable and
just, and in line with our thought, for the plaintiff ought to
have known of the true construction the defendant was placing the expression of its intention.
The case of Hathaway v. County of Delaware 2 2 is one
comparable to the payment of taxes on a wrong lot. In that
instance, plaintiff (due to the representation of one Woodruff, who had been, but unknown to the plaintiff no longer
was, the defendant's agent), thought he was loaning money
by check to the County, while the defendant, because of the
misrepresentation of the same Woodruff, thought the money
was a payment by the plaintiff of Woodruff's debt to the
County. It was held that the plaintiff could recover back
the payment for the reason that the County had not lost its
right of recourse against Woodruff. Some may argue that
this is a case of mutual mistake, but to that must come the
answer that the parties were not making the same mistake.
The plaintiff was in error in thinking that the County was
borrowing money from him, while the defendant's mistake
was in thinking that the plaintiff's check was a means em23
ployed to satisfy Woodruff's debt to it.
Similarly, no doubt, one who pays the tax on his neighbor's lot may have the payment applied to his own tax if he
moves before the rights of the municipality against the
true owner, have not been lost.2 4 These thoughts are quite
in accord with the previously mentioned statement of Mr.
Lawrence that relief may be granted for unilateral mistake
standing alone, or perhaps even coupled with negligence of
the mistaken party, if the party not mistaken has not changed
his position, and that retaining the benefits of a mistake is
not to be permitted unless relief would be prejudicial to the
one unfairly benefitted.
185 N. Y. 368. 78 N. E. 153 (1906).
The plaintiff had drawn the check to the order of Woodruff. Had he
drawn it to the order of the County, a different result would have been reached
by the court. We may, then, consider the designation of Woodruff as payee
to be an expression of the plaintiff's intention, obvious to the defendant, that
the payment was to Woodruff and not to the County. Thus this case comes
within the modern doctrine of expressed intention.
- Cf. N. Y. L. J., Feb. 24, 1930 at 2612.
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Martin v. McCormick, 25 though involving mutual mistake, suggests a point worthy of discussion. In that case, the
plaintiff's land, having been sold for taxes, had been redeemed, but plaintiff and defendant both believed that title
to the premises was vested in the latter. Plaintiff thereafter
purchased the "title" from the defendant, and upon discovery of the facts sued to recover the amount so paid.
Let us suppose that A agrees to sell B a life estate in
Blackacre. Unknown to the parties, A's interest is a fee, but
in performance of his contract A executes and delivers a
quitclaim deed (though that is not that particular instrument called for by the agre*ement). Upon discovery of the
mistake, A, unquestionably, could have reformation, under
the reasoning of Martin v. McCormick. 26 Now let us change
the facts in the Martin case, so that the facts become unilateral by supposing that the defendant knew that he had
no title. Let us also change the facts of our "Blackacre"
hypothesis to make the mistake there unilateral also, by
assuming that B knew that A's interest was a fee. Would
Martin succeed in recovering back his payment? Would A
succeed in obtaining reformation? Clearly so, for the latter
hypotheses present stronger cases than the former. Some
might go so far as to say that the silence of McCormick and
the silence of B constitute such inequitable conduct as to
justify relief. The writer does not agree that this is so if the
parties dealt at arm's length as do vendor and vendee, for
then there would be no duty to speak imposed on the defendant. But in all fairness, relief should certainly be granted
if there was on the part of these defendants knowledge of the
plaintiff's mistaken notions.2 7
It has been consistently held that for mistake as to the
contents of a written agreement (where there is no inequitable conduct) due to the failure to read it, relief cannot be
-8 N. Y. 331 (1854).
' Supra Note 25. See also Lawrence, etc., supra Note 10, Sec. 110, Note 50,
in accord with this view. This is scarcely a debatable point for the minds in

this instance met on a life estate only.
'This conclusion is characterized by the decision in the case of City of
New York v. Dowd Lumber Co., s1pra Note 14.
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had.2 8 But if the signing without reading was due to the
inability of the mistaken party to read English 29 or if the
mistaken person had left his glasses at home and could not
read without them,30 relief may be had. The equities in the
last two situations are quite obvious. There is no need of further comment except to point out that in each instance the
expression was chosen by the defending party and that the
plaintiff had no available means of discovering to what expression he was assenting.
It has been held that a pleading of mistake in reducing
to writing an apparent agreement need not contain an allegation of mutuality.3 1 A reading of this case, however, will
not show anything actually opposed to the newer theory. The
Court, in a portion of the opinion, stated:
"It was not necessary for them to allege a mutual
mistake in the reduction of the agreement to writing,
there being no mistake as to the agreement. In such a
case, if, by the mistake of the scrivener or by any other
inadvertence, the writing does not express the agreement actually made, it may be reformed by the Court.
It is only where the action is to reform the agreement
itself that it is required that it should be alleged in
the pleading and proved on the trial that the mistake
was mutual."

32

Whatever was in the mind of the Court (other than the
failure of the writing to express an agreement actually made)
as a case justifying reformation for mistake in reducing an
agreement to writing, does not appear. Indeed, to distinguish
between seeking t6 reform an apparent agreement so as to
reinstate an actual agreement on the one hand, and on the
other seeking "to reform the agreement itself" is not easy to
'Metzger, etc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 227 N. Y. 411, 125 N. E. 814 (1920);
American T. & H., etc. v. Van Blerkom, 216 App. Div. 28, 214 N. Y. Supp.
753 (1st Dept. 1926) ; Wheeler v. Mowers, 16 Misc. 143, 34 N. Y. Supp. 115

(1896).
' Melle v. Candelora, 88 N. Y. Supp. 385 (App. Term 1904).
'Whipple v. Brown Bros. Co., 225 N. Y. 237, 121 N. E. 748 (1919).
" Born v. Schrenkeisen, 110 N. Y. 55, 17 N. E. 339 (1888).
"Ibid. at 59, 17 N. E. at 341.
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appreciate. Perhaps the Court was overlooking the fact that
actual agreements are not reformed, for they do not need
reinstatement by reformation, and it is a trite observation
that courts will not make new agreements for parties.
However, as a proposition of mere pleading the quoted
dictum is probably correct, so nothing in the result conflicts
with the newer theory. The decree awarded reformed an apparent agreement to reinstate an actual one, for the contract
executed differed from that which the parties had intended.
As a substantive matter then, in cases involving mistakes
in reducing agreements to writing the expressed intention
should govern as truly as in any other case of mistake, unless
there was mutual mistake in the expression. This is well
exemplified by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Metzger
v. Insurance Co.3 We have seen that the modern theory of
expressed intention in the law of contracts precludes the possibility of obtaining rescission for unilateral mistake standing by itself. Nevertheless, not even that doctrine will prevent courts of equity from granting relief in a proper case
where the ends of justice require it and where special circumstances are present to justify judicial distinction.
DAVID STEWART EDGAR,

St. John's College School of Law.
'

Supra Note 28.
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